Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Norm Monitoring in Open Multi-Agent Systems (Extended Abstract)

Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Norm Monitoring in Open Multi-Agent Systems (Extended Abstract)

Natasha Alechina, Joseph Y. Halpern, Ian A. Kash, Brian Logan

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Journal track. Pages 5543-5547. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/781

We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). In this extended abstract, we outline the approach of [Alechina et al., 2018], and show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations.
Keywords:
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Coordination and Cooperation
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Normative systems
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games