On the Splitting Property for Epistemic Logic Programs (Extended Abstract)

On the Splitting Property for Epistemic Logic Programs (Extended Abstract)

Pedro Cabalar, Jorge Fandinno, Luis Fariñas del Cerro

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Sister Conferences Best Papers. Pages 4721-4725. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/653

Epistemic logic programs constitute an extension of the stable model semantics to deal with new constructs called "subjective literals." Informally speaking, a subjective literal allows checking whether some objective literal is true in all or some stable models. However, its associated semantics has proved to be non-trivial, since the truth of subjective literals may interfere with the set of stable models it is supposed to query. As a consequence, no clear agreement has been reached and different semantic proposals have been made in the literature. In this paper, we review an extension of the well-known splitting property for logic programs to the epistemic case. This "epistemic splitting property" is defined as a general condition that can be checked on any arbitrary epistemic semantics. Its satisfaction has desirable consequences both in the representation of conformant planning problems and in the encoding of the so-called subjective constraints.
Keywords:
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Logics for Knowledge Representation
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Non-monotonic Reasoning, Common-Sense Reasoning
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Reasoning about Knowledge and Belief