Equivalence in Abductive Logic
Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 472-476.
Abstract
We consider the problem of identifying equivalence of two knowledge bases which are capable of abductive reasoning. Here, a knowledge base is written in either first-order logic or nonmonotonic logic programming. In this work, we will give two definitions of abductive equivalence. The first one, explainable equivalence, requires that two abductive programs have the same explainability for any observation. Another one, explanatory equivalence, guarantees that any observation has exactly the same explanations in each abductive framework. Explanatory equivalence is a stronger notion than explainable equivalence. In first-order abduction, explainable equivalence can be verified by the notion of extensional equivalence in default theories. In nonmonotonic logic programs, explanatory equivalence can be checked by means of the notion of relative strong equivalence. We also show the complexity results for abductive equivalence.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, abduction is used in many AI applications, including diagnosis, design, updates, and discovery. Abduction is an important paradigm for problem solving, and is incorporated in programming technologies, i.e., abductive logic programming (ALP) [12]. Automated abduction is also studied in the literature as an extension of deductive methods or a part of inductive systems, and its computational properties have also been studied [22; 2; 3; 4].
In this work, we are concerned with such computational issues on abductive reasoning. Despite being a problemsolving paradigm, ALP has a lot of issues which have not been fully understood yet. In particular, there are no concrete methods for (a) evaluation of abductive power in ALP, (b) measurement of efficiency in abductive reasoning, (c) semantically correct simplification and optimization, (d) debugging and verification in ALP, and (e) standardization in ALP. Since all these topics are important for any programming paradigm, the lack of them is a serious drawback of ALP. Then, it can be recognized that all the above issues are related to different notions of identification or equivalence in ALP. In particular,
Chiaki Sakama
Wakayama University Sakaedani, Wakayama 640-8510 Japan sakama@sys.wakayama-u.ac.jp
the item (c) is related to understanding the semantics of ALP with respect to modularity and contexts.
Abduction can be formalized in various logics [13]. Then, we can consider several notions of equivalence in several logics for abduction. In this paper, we will give two definitions of abductive equivalence in two logical frameworks for abduction. Two logics we consider here are first-order logic (FOL) and abductive logic programming (ALP). The first abductive equivalence, called explainable equivalence, requires that two abductive programs have the same explainability for any observation. Another one, explanatory equivalence, guarantees that any observation has exactly the same explanations in each abductive framework. Explanatory equivalence is stronger than explainable equivalence.
In this paper, we characterize these two notions of abductive equivalence in terms of other well-known concepts in AI and logic programming. In abduction in first-order logic, we will see that explainable equivalence can be verified by the notion of equivalence in default logic [18], which is defined for the families of extensions of two default theories. On the other hand, abductive equivalence in ALP is more complicated than in the case of FOL due to the nonmonotonicity in logic programs. In fact, equivalence between two abductive logic programs has little been discussed in the literature except that effects of partial deduction in ALP are analyzed in [20]. Here, we will see that explanatory equivalence in ALP can be characterized by the notion of (relative) strong equivalence [14; 10; 24].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents two definitions for abductive equivalence. Section 3 considers first-order logic as the representation language, while Section 4 considers nonmonotonic logic programming for ALP. Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
2 Abductive Equivalence
We start with the question as to when two abductive frameworks are equivalent. As far as the authors know, there is no answer for such a question in the literature of ALP. There are many parameters which should be considered important in defining equivalence notions in abductive frameworks. In the world, both background knowledge and observations are surely essential. In an agent who performs abduction, on the other hand, her abductive power must depend on her logic
(language, syntax, semantics) of background knowledge, observations and hypotheses. Moreover, the quality of abduction is relevant to other parameters such as axioms, inference procedures, logics of explanations, and criteria of best explanations. If we would take all such parameters into account, the task of defining the equivalence notion might become combinatorial and too complex.
In the following, we thus consider a rather simple framework for our problem while we try to hold the essence of equivalence notions as much as possible. First, logic, background knowledge and hypotheses are put as input parameters in each abductive framework. Secondly, a logic of explanations is taken into account in a definition, but its diversity is reflected in different notions of abductive equivalence.
The following definition of abductive frameworks is a standard one [13; 22; 2; 3]. As a notation, A6 CYBP BY means that a formula BY is derived from a set A6 of formulas in a logic .
Definition 2.1 Let BU and be sets of formulas in some underlying logic . An abductive framework is defined as a triple B4BNBUBN B5, where BU is called background knowledge and each element of is called a candidate hypothesis.
Definition 2.2 Let B4BNBUBN B5 be an abductive framework, and a formula in , and BX a formula belonging to . We define that BX is an explanation of an observation in B4BN BUBN B5 if BU CJ BX CYBP and BU CJ BX is consistent in . We say that is explainable in B4BN BUBN B5 if it has an explanation in B4BN BUBN B5.
We now give two definitions for abductive equivalence. We assume that the underlying logic is common when two abductive theories are compared.
Definition 2.3 Two abductive frameworks B4BNBU BD BN BD B5 and B4BN BU BE BN BE B5 are explainably equivalent if, for any observation , there is an explanation of in B4BNBU BD BN BD B5 iff there is an explanation of in B4BN BU BE BN BE B5.
Explainable equivalence requires that two abductive frameworks have the same explainability for any observation. Explainable equivalence may reflect a situation that two programs have different knowledge to derive the same goals.
Definition 2.4 Two abductive frameworks B4BNBU BD BN BD B5 and B4BNBU BE BN BE B5 are explanatorily equivalent if, for any observation , BX is an explanation of in B4BNBU BD BN BD B5 iff BX is an explanation of in B4BN BU BE BN BE B5.
Explanatory equivalence assures that two abductive frameworks have the same explanation power for any observation. Explanatory equivalence is stronger than explainable equivalence as follows.
Proposition 2.1 If abductive frameworks B4BNBU BD BN BD B5 and B4BNBU BE BN BE B5 are explanatorily equivalent, then they are explainably equivalent.
For explanatory equivalence, we can assume that the hypotheses are common in two abductive frameworks in Definition 2.4, as the following property holds.
Proposition 2.2 If BT BD BP B4BNBU BD BN BD B5 andBT BE BP B4BNBU BE BN BE B5 are explanatorily equivalent, then BC BD BP BC BE , where BC CX BP CUCW BE CX CY BU CX CJ CUCWCV is consistent in CV for CX BP BDBN BE.
Proof. Assume that BC BD D2 BC BE BIBP BN. Then, for a formula B3 BE BC BD D2 BC BE , CUB3CV is an explanation of B3 in BT BD because BU BD CJ CUB3CV is consistent in . However, CUB3CV is not an explanation of B3 in BT BE . Hence, BT BD and BT BE are not explanatorily equivalent. BE
Note in Proposition 2.2 that any hypothesis CW in CX D2 BC CX cannot be added without violating the consistency of BU CX CJCUCWCV in . Thus, BC CX is the set of hypotheses that can be actually used in explanations of some formulas.
Example 2.1 Suppose the abductive frameworks BT BD BP B4FOLBN CUCPARD4CVBN CUCPBN CQCVB5 and BT BE BP B4FOLBN CUCQARD4CVBN CUCPBN CQCVB5. Then, BT BD and BT BE are explainably equivalent, but are not explanatorily equivalent. On the other hand, BT BF BP B4FOLBN CUCPARD4CVBN CUCQCVB5 and BT BG BP B4FOLBN CUCQARD4CVBN CUCQCVB5 are neither explainably equivalent nor explanatorily equivalent.
3 Abduction in First-order Logic
Abduction is used in many AI applications, and classical firstorder logic is most often used as the underlying logic for abduction [17; 13; 2; 22]. When the underlying logic is FOL, the relation CYBP becomes the usual entailment relation CYBP. In first-order abduction, explanations are usually defined as a set of ground instances from hypotheses [17]. That is, a set BX of ground instances of elements of is an explanation of in B4FOLBN BUBN B5 if A6 CJ BX CYBP and A6 CJ BX is consistent.
In the following, CCCWB4A6B5 denotes the set of logical consequences of a set A6 of first-order formulas. That is, CCCWB4A6B5 BP CUBY CY A6 CYBP BYCV. The next definition is originally given for default logic by Reiter [18].
Definition 3.1 [19; 17] Let BU and be sets of first-order formulas. An extension of BU with respect to is CCCWB4BU CJ CBB5 where CB is a maximal subset of ground instances of elements from such that BU CJ CB is consistent.
Using the notion of extensions, explainable equivalence can be characterized in first-order abduction.
Theorem 3.1 Two abductive frameworks B4FOLBN BU BD BN BD B5 and B4FOLBN BU BE BN BE B5 are explainably equivalent iff the extensions of BU BD with respect to BD coincide with the extensions of BU BE with respect to BE .
Proof. First, we claim that the union of the extensions of BU with respect to are exactly the set of formulas explainable in B4FOLBNBUBN B5. To see this, we can use a wellknown theorem [17; 22] that a formula can be explained in B4FOLBNBUBN B5 iff there is a consistent extension CG of BU with respect to such that CG contains . Thus, the set of all explainable formulas are precisely those formulas contained in at least one extension of BU with respect to .
Now, let BT BD BP B4FOLBNBU BD BN BD B5 and BT BE BP B4FOLBNBU BE BN BE B5 be two abductive frameworks. Suppose that the extensions of BU BD with respect to BD coincide with those of BU BE with respect to BE . By the above claim, the set of formulas explainable in BT BD is equal to the set of formulas explainable in BT BE . This means that BT BD and BT BE are explainably equivalent.
Conversely, assume that there is an extension CG BE of BU BE with respect to BE which is not an extension of BU BD with respect to BD . Let BY CG BE be a first-order formula which is logically equivalent to CG BE . Such a formula actually exists because CG BE BP CCCWB4BU BE CJ CBB5 holds for some maximally consistent subset CB of BE , and hence CG BE is logically equivalent to CE CUBEBU BE CU CM CE CVBECB CV. Since CG BE is consistent, BY CG BE is consistent too. Then, BY CG BE is explainable in BT BE because CB is an explanation of BY CG BE .
Now, if BY CG BE is not explainable in BT BD , then obviously BT BD and BT BE are not explainably equivalent. Hence, there is an explanation of BY CG BE in BT BD . Then, there is an extension CG BD of BU BD with respect to BD which contains BY CG BE . Since CG BE is not an extension ofBU BD with respect to BD , CG BD BIBPCG BE holds. Then, CG BE AQ CG BD . Let BY CG BD be a formula which is logically equivalent to CG BD . By the same argument as above, BY CG BD is explainable in BT BD . However, this BY CG BD cannot be explained in BT BE . This is because, if BY CG BD were explained in BT BE , there must be an extension CG BC BE of BU BE with respect to BE such that CG BE AQ CG BC BE , which is impossible because any extension is orthogonal to another extension in a default theory [18]. In any case, BT BD and BT BE are not explainably equivalent. BE
In [15], Reiter's default theories A1 BD BP B4BW BD BNBU BD B5 and A1 BE BP B4BW BE BNBU BE B5 are said to be equivalent if the extensions of A1 BD are the same as the extensions of A1 BE . When an abductive framework B4FOLBNBUBN B5 is given, we can associate a default theory A1 BP B4BWBNBUB5 where BW is the set of prerequisite-free normal defaults CU BMCS CS CY CS BE CV such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the extensions of A1 and the extensions of BU with respect to [17].
Corollary 3.2 Two abductive frameworks B4FOLBNBU BD BN BD B5 and B4FOLBNBU BE BN BE B5 are explainably equivalent iff the default theories B4BW BD BNBU BD B5 and B4BW BE BNBU BE B5 are equivalent where BW CX BP CU BMCS CS CY CS BE CX CV for CX BP BDBN BE.
Example 3.1 Suppose two abductive frameworks, BT BD BP B4FOLBN BU BD BN BD B5 and BT BE BP B4FOLBN BU BE BN BE B5, where
BU BD BP CUCP AR D4BN CQ AR BMD4CVBN