Kernel Contraction and Base Dependence: Redundancy in the Base Resulting in Different Types of Dependence / 3134
Mehrdad Oveisi, James P. Delgrande, Fred Popowich, Francis Jeffry Pelletier
The AGM paradigm of belief change studies the dynamics of belief states in light of new information. Finding, or even approximating, dependent or relevant beliefs to a change is valuable because, for example, it can narrow the set of beliefs considered during belief change operations. Gärdenfors' preservation criterion (GPC) suggests that formulas independent of a belief change should remain intact. GPC allows to build dependence relations that are theoretically linked with belief change. Such dependence relations can in turn be used as a theoretical benchmark against which to evaluate other approximate dependence or relevance relations. There are already some studies, based on GPC, on the parallelism between belief change and dependence. One study offers a dependence relation parallel to AGM contraction for belief sets. Another study links base dependence relation to a more general belief base contraction, saturated kernel contraction. Here we offer yet a more general parallelism between kernel contraction and base dependence. At this level of generalization, different types of base dependence emerge. We prove that this differentiation of base dependence types is a result of possible redundancy in the base. This provides a theoretical means to distinguish between redundant and informative parts of a belief base.