Interdependent Scheduling Games / 2
Andres Abeliuk, Haris Aziz, Gerardo Berbeglia, Serge Gaspers, Petr Kalina, Nicholas Mattei, Dominik Peters, Paul Stursberg, Pascal Van Hentenryck, Toby Walsh
We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.