Belief Change in a Preferential Non-monotonic Framework

Belief Change in a Preferential Non-monotonic Framework

Giovanni Casini, Thomas Meyer

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main track. Pages 929-935. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/129

Belief change and non-monotonic reasoning are usually viewed as two sides of the same coin, with results showing that one can formally be defined in terms of the other. In this paper we show that it also makes sense to analyse belief change within a (preferential) non-monotonic framework. We consider belief change operators in a non-monotonic propositional setting with a view towards preserving consistency. We show that the results obtained can also be applied to the preservation of coherence— an important notion within the field of logic-based ontologies. We adopt the AGM approach to belief change and show that standard AGM can be adapted to a preferential non-monotonic framework, with the definition of expansion, contraction, and revision operators, and corresponding representation results.
Keywords:
Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Logic: Non-monotonic Reasoning
Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Logic: Belief Change
Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Logic: Logics for Knowledge Representation