Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms

Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms

Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main track. Pages 240-246. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/33

Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017], is to find a small set (possibly, the smallest) of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines or verifying a linear number of agents.
Keywords:
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems