Proceedings

Evaluating Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting in Terms of Robustness to Noise

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main track. Pages 74-80.

https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/11

Abstract

Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness, we propose to employ new noise models that are specifically tailored for approval votes and committees. These models take as input a ground truth committee and return random approval votes to be thought of as noisy estimates of the ground truth. A minimum robustness requirement for an approval-based multiwinner voting rule is to return the ground truth when applied to profiles with sufficiently many noisy votes. Our results indicate that approval-based multiwinner voting can indeed be robust to reasonable noise. We further refine this finding by presenting a hierarchy of rules in terms of how robust to noise they are.

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