Visual backdoor attack is a recently-emerging task which aims to implant trojans in a deep neural model. A trojaned model responds to a trojan-invoking trigger in a fully predictable manner while functioning normally otherwise. As a key motivating fact to this work, most triggers adopted in existing methods, such as a learned patterned block that overlays a benigh image, can be easily noticed by human. In this work, we take image recognition and detection as the demonstration tasks, building trojaned networks that are significantly less human-perceptible and can simultaneously attack multiple targets in an image. The main technical contributions are two-folds: first, under a relaxed attack mode, we formulate trigger embedding as an image steganography-and-steganalysis problem that conceals a secret image in another image in a decipherable and almost invisible way. In specific, a variable number of different triggers can be encoded into a same secret image and fed to an encoder module that does steganography. Secondly, we propose a generic split-and-merge scheme for training a trojaned model. Neurons are split into two sets, trained either for normal image recognition / detection or trojaning the model. To merge them, we novelly propose to hide trojan neurons within the nullspace of the normal ones, such that the two sets do not interfere with each other and the resultant model exhibits similar parameter statistics to a clean model. Comprehensive experiments are conducted on the datasets PASCAL VOC and Microsoft COCO (for detection) and a subset of ImageNet (for recognition). All results clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed visual trojan method.