Mechanism Design with Predictions

Mechanism Design with Predictions

Chenyang Xu, Pinyan Lu

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main Track. Pages 571-577. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/81

Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of imperfect predictions to design mechanisms that perform much better than traditional mechanisms if the predictions are accurate (consistency), while always retaining worst-case guarantees even with very imprecise predictions (robustness). Furthermore, we refer to the largest prediction error sufficient to give a good performance as the error tolerance of a mechanism, and observe that an intrinsic tradeoff among consistency, robustness and error tolerance is common for mechanism design with predictions.
Keywords:
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Mechanism Design
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory