Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods
Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods
Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main Track. Pages 3988-3995.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/444
When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where m chores are allocated to n agents and the disutility of each chore for each agent is drawn from a probability distribution. We show that an envy-free allocation exists with high probability provided that m >= 2n, and moreover, m must be at least n+Theta(n) in order for the existence to hold. On the other hand, we prove that a proportional allocation is likely to exist as long as m = omega(1), and this threshold is asymptotically tight. Our results reveal a clear contrast with the allocation of goods, where a larger number of items is necessary to ensure existence for both notions.
Keywords:
Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocation
