Altruism in Coalition Formation Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main track. Pages 347-353. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/49
Nguyen et al.  introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents’ utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation games in general, considering also the friends in other coalitions. Comparing the two models, we argue that excluding some friends from the altruistic behavior of an agent is a major disadvantage that comes with the restriction to hedonic games. After introducing our model, we additionally study some common stability notions and provide a computational analysis of the associated verification and existence problems.
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Cooperative Games