Participatory Budgeting with Project Interactions
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main track. Pages 386-392. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/54
Participatory budgeting systems allow city residents to jointly decide on projects they wish to fund using public money, by letting residents vote on such projects. While participatory budgeting is gaining popularity, existing aggregation methods do not take into account the natural possibility of project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity effects. Here we take a step towards fixing this issue: First, we augment the standard model of participatory budgeting by introducing a partition over the projects and model the type and extent of project interactions within each part using certain functions. We study the computational complexity of finding bundles that maximize voter utility, as defined with respect to such functions. Motivated by the desire to incorporate project interactions in real-world participatory budgeting systems, we identify certain cases that admit efficient aggregation in the presence of such project interactions.
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice