Two Forms of Responsibility in Strategic Games

Two Forms of Responsibility in Strategic Games

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main Track. Pages 1989-1995. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/274

The paper studies two forms of responsibility, seeing to it and being blamable, in the setting of strategic games with imperfect information. The paper shows that being blamable is definable through seeing to it, but not the other way around. In addition, it proposes a bimodal logical system that describes the interplay between the seeing to it modality and the individual knowledge modality.
Keywords:
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Action, Change and Causality
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Knowledge Representation and Game Theory; Social Choice
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Logics for Knowledge Representation