We study a cooperative game setting where we want to gather more players through their social connections. Social connections can be modeled as a graph, and initially, only a subset of the players are in the game. We want to introduce diffusion incentives in such a cooperative game, i.e., incentivize the players to use their connections to invite more players to join the game. Our goal cannot be achieved by existing classical solutions, such as the Shapley value. Hence, to combat this problem, we have already proposed a solution called weighted permission Shapley value. Under this solution, for each player, inviting all of her neighbors is a dominant strategy in all monotone games. As one special application of the diffusion cooperative game, we also considered the diffusion incentives in query networks and the weighted permission Shapley value successfully characterizes the solution to the query network. Furthermore, we also characterize a Sybil-proof solution to the query network called the double geometric mechanism.