Matchings under One-Sided Preferences with Soft Quotas
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 2774-2782.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/309
Keywords
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice
Abstract
Assigning applicants to posts in the presence of the preferences of applicants and quotas associated with posts is extensively investigated. For a post, lower quota guarantees, and upper quota limits the number of applicants assigned to it. Typically, quotas are assumed to be fixed, which need not be the case in practice. We address this by introducing a soft quota setting, in which every post is associated with two values – lower target and upper target which together denote a range for the intended number of applicants in any assignment. Unlike the fixed quota setting, we allow the number of applicants assigned to a post to fall outside the range. This leads to assignments with deviation. Here, we study the problem of computing an assignment that has two orthogonal optimization objectives – minimizing the deviation (maximum or total) w.r.t. soft quotas and ensuring optimality w.r.t. preferences of applicants (rank-maximality or fairness). The order in which these objectives are considered, the different possibilities to optimize deviation combined with the well-studied notions of optimality w.r.t. preferences open up a range of optimization problems of practical importance. We present efficient algorithms based on flow-networks to solve these optimization problems.
@inproceedings{ijcai2023p309,
title = {Matchings under One-Sided Preferences with Soft Quotas},
author = {K. A., Santhini and Ravi, Raghu Raman and Nasre, Meghana},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-23}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Edith Elkind},
pages = {2774--2782},
year = {2023},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2023/309},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/309},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Matchings under One-Sided Preferences with Soft Quotas AU - K. A., Santhini AU - Ravi, Raghu Raman AU - Nasre, Meghana T2 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-23 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2023 SP - 2774 EP - 2782 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2023/309 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/309 ER -Copied
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