Fair Division of a Graph into Compact Bundles

Fair Division of a Graph into Compact Bundles

Jayakrishnan Madathil

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main Track. Pages 2835-2843. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/316

We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in such a way that (a) the allocation is fair (for appropriate notions of fairness) and (b) each agent receives a bundle of items (i.e., a subset of vertices) that induces a subgraph with a specific ``nice structure.'' This model has previously been studied in the literature with the nice structure being a connected subgraph. In this paper, we propose an alternative for connectivity in fair division. We introduce compact graphs, and look for fair allocations in which each agent receives a compact bundle of items. Through compactness, we attempt to capture the idea that every agent must receive a bundle of ``closely related'' items. We prove a host of hardness and tractability results with respect to fairness concepts such as proportionality, envy-freeness and maximin share guarantee.
Keywords:
Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocation